Card Sessions: Small Group Genius
In a network, joint sauntering guided by proprioception of thought.
Small Group Genius: Four skills and literacies
The generative and productive ambiance in a small group is a function of four skills and literacies:
- Questions
Ability to formulate and hold space for great questions. - Social Computing
Skillful digital interaction, conversations and transactions. - Group Ambiance
Sensibilities and literacies related to enaction and proprioception of thought. - Framing and Reframing
Emerging and unfolding lines of inquiry, co-evolving with intelligence turned ability.
The case for proprioception
Ellen Fridland
Abstract
In formulating a theory of perception that does justice to the embodied and enactive nature of perceptual experience, proprioception can play a valuable role.
Since proprioception is necessarily embodied, and since proprioceptive experience is particularly integrated with one’s bodily actions, it seems clear that proprioception, in addition to, e.g., vision or audition, can provide us with valuable insights into the role of an agent’s corporal skills and capacities in constituting or structuring perceptual experience.
However, if we are going to have the opportunity to argue from analogy with proprioception to vision, audition, touch, taste, or smell, then it is necessary to eschew any doubts about the legitimacy of proprioception’s inclusion into the category of perceptual modalities.
To this end, in this article, I
(1) respond to two arguments that Shaun Gallagher (2003) presents in “Bodily self-awareness and objectperception” against proprioception’s ability to meet the criteria of object perception,
(2) present a diagnosis of Gallagher’s position by locating a misunderstanding in the distinction between proprioceptive information and proprioceptive awareness, and
(3) show that treating proprioception as a perceptual modality allows us to account for the interaction of proprioception with the other sensory modalities, to apply the lessons we learn from proprioception to the other sensory modalities, and to account for proprioceptive learning. Finally,
(4) I examine Sydney Shoemaker’s (1994) identification constraint and suggest that a full-fledged notion of object-hood is unnecessary to ground a theory of perception.
Keywords
Proprioception, Perception, Non-conscious perception, Perceptual learning
